Public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) enables user Alice to send a secret key TW to a server that will enable the server to locate all encrypted messages containing the keyword W , but learn nothing else. In this paper, we propose a new PKES scheme based on pairings. There is no pairing operation involved in the encryption procedure. Then, we provide further discussion on removing secure channel from PKES, and present an efficient secure channel free PKES scheme. Our two new schemes can be proved secure in the random oracle model, under the appropriate computational assumptions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, Boneh et.al [1] proposed the concept of public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme to enable one to search encrypted keywords without compromising the security of the original data. Suppose Bob wants to send Alice a message M with keywords W 1 , W 2 , ..., W n . Let pk A be Alice's public key. Bob encrypts M using a standard public key encryption E(.). He then appends to the resulting ciphertext a list of PEKS ciphertext of each keyword. That is E(M, pk A )||P KES(W 1 , pk A )||...||P KES(W n , pk A ). This kind of encrypted messages may be stored in a server. Alice can give the server a certain trapdoor T W through a secure channel that enables the server to test whether one of the keywords associated with the message is equal to the word W of Alice's choice.
Given P KES(W , pk A ) and T W , the server can test whether W = W . If W = W the server learns nothing more about W .
Such PEKS scheme can be widely used in many practical applications. For instance, Boneh et.al [1] explain that PEKS provides a mechanism that allows user Alice to have his email server extract encrypted emails that contain a particular keyword by providing a trapdoor corresponding to the keyword, while the email server and other parties excluding Alice do not learn anything else about the email. Shortly after Boneh et al.'s work, Waters et al. [2] showed that the PEKS scheme can be applied to build encrypted and searchable audit logs.
The scheme of Boneh et.al [1] needs secure channel to transmit trapdoors to the server. However, building a secure channel is usually expensive. Very recently, Baek et al. [3] discussed "removing secure channel", and provided a notion of secure channel free public key encryption with keyword search (SCF-PEKS) scheme.
In this paper, we propose a new PKES scheme based on pairings. Its encryption procedure needs no pairing operation. So our scheme is more efficient than that of Boneh et.al's. Then, we provide further discussion on the notion and security model for SCF-PEKS scheme, and present an efficient SCF-PEKS scheme. The new schemes can be proved secure in the random oracle model, under the appropriate computational assumptions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we recall some preliminary works. In Section 3, we present a new PKES scheme with efficiency discussion and security proof. In Section 4, we provide further discussion on the formal model for SCF-PEKS schemes, and present an new efficient SCF-PEKS scheme with provable security. Finally, we end the paper with a brief conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search
Definition 1. A public key encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) scheme consists of four polynomial-time algorithms:
• KeyGen: Take as input a security parameter λ, generate a public/private key pair (pk, sk).
• Trapdoor: Take as input the receiver's private key sk and a word W , produce a trapdoor T W .
• PKES: Take as input the receiver's a public key pk and a word W , produce a searchable encryption of W .
• Test: Take as input the receiver's public key pk, a searchable encryption C = P EKS(pk, W ), and a trapdoor T W = T rapdoor(sk, W ), output 1 ("yes") if W = W and 0 ("no") otherwise.
Consistency requires that for any keyword
In [1] , Boneh et.al defined a security notion for PEKS schemes-"indistinguishability of PEKS against chosen keyword attack" (IND-CKA).
IND-CKA game:
• KeyGen: The challenger runs the KeyGen(λ) algorithm to generate (pk, sk). It gives pk to the attacker.
• Phase 1: The attacker can adaptively ask the challenger for the trapdoor T W for any keyword W ∈ {0, 1} * of his choice.
• Challenge: At some point, the attacker A sends the challenger two words W 0 , W 1 on which it wishes to be challenged. The only restriction is that the attacker did not previously ask for the trapdoors T W0 or T W1 . The challenger picks a random b ∈ {0, 1} and gives the attacker C = P EKS(pk, W b ) as the challenge PEKS ciphertext.
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• Phase 2: The attacker can continue to ask for trapdoors T W for any keyword W of his choice as long as
• Guess: Eventually, the attacker A outputs b ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b = b .
Such an adversary A is called an IND-CKA adversary. A's advantage in attacking the scheme E is defined as the following function of the security parameter λ:
The probability is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary. 
B. Bilinear Pairings
Let (G 1 , +) and (G 2 , ·) be two cyclic groups of prime order q.ê :
be a map which satisfies the following properties.
2) Non-degenerate: If P is a generator of G 1 , thenê(P, P ) is a generator of G 2 ;
3) Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to computeê(P, Q) for any P, Q ∈ G 1 .
Such an bilinear map is called an admissible bilinear pairing [4] . The Weil pairings and the Tate pairings of elliptic curves can be used to construct efficient admissible bilinear pairings.
We review two complexity problems related to bilinear pairings: the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem [4] and the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inverse (BDHI) problem [5] , [6] . Let P be a generator of G 1 , and a, b, c ∈ Z * q .
• BDH problem: given P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G 1 , outputê(P, P ) abc . An algorithm A solves BDH problem with the
where the probability is over the random choice of generator P ∈ G * 1 , the random choice of a, b, c ∈ Z * q and random coins consumed by A.
• k-BDHI problem: given (P, aP, a
problem with the probability ε if
where the probability is over the random choice of generator P ∈ G * 1 , the random choice of a ∈ Z * q and random coins consumed by A.
We assume through this paper that BDH problem and k-BDHI problem are intractable, which means that there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve BDH problem or k-BDHI problem with non-negligible probability. March 6, 2006 DRAFT III. A NEW PKES SCHEME FROM PAIRINGS
A. The Scheme
Let (G 1 , +) and (G 2 , ·) be two cyclic groups of prime order q,ê :
log q be two hash functions. P is a generator of G 1 , µ =ê(P, P ).
The scheme is described as following:
• KeyGen: Pick a random x ∈ Z * q , compute X = xP , and output pk = X, and sk = x.
• Trapdoor: Take as input secret key x and keyword W , and output
• PEKS: Take as input public key X and a keyword W , select randomly r ∈ Z * q , compute U = rH 1 (W )P +rX, c = H 2 (µ r ) and output (U, c).
• Test: For input public key X, searchable encryption cipher-text (U, c) and
c. If so, output 1; otherwise, output 0.
B. Consistency and Efficiency
Consistency of the scheme is easily proved as follows:
Denote by M an ordinary scalar multiplication in (G 1 , +), by E an Exp. operation in (G 2 , .), and byê a computation of the pairing. The hash function H 1 : {0, 1} * → G * 1 used by the scheme in [1] usually requires a "Maptopoint operation" [4] to map a keyword to an element in G 1 . As discussed in [4] , Maptopoint operation (denoted by P ) is so inefficient that we can't neglect it. Do not take other operations into account. We compare our scheme to the scheme in [1] 
Note: The hash function used in our scheme which maps a keyword to an element in Z * q is so efficient that we usually can neglect it.
The construction seems to be more efficient in performance. Although fruitful achievements [7] , [8] have been made in enhancing the computation of pairings, the computation of pairings is still time consuming. Our new scheme requires no pairing operation in PKES procedure.
Some general performance enhancements can also be applied to our scheme. For pre-selected P ∈ G 1 and µ ∈ G 2 , there are efficient algorithms [9] to compute rH 1 (ID X )P and µ r for a random r ∈ Z * q by pre-computing and storing. March Proof: F 1 is given input parameters of pairing (q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê) and a random instance (P, aP, a 2 P, ..., a n P ) of the n-BDHI problem, where P is random in G * 1 and a is a random in Z * q . F 1 simulates the challenger and interacts with F 0 as follows:
situation where Q = 1 G1 , there exist an h i = −a, hence, F 1 can solve the n-BDHI problem directly and abort.
4. Randomly choose an index t with 1 ≤ t ≤ n, set v = 0, and start by giving F 0 the public key Y = aQ−h 0 Q.
• Phase 1: H 1 -queries. F 1 maintains a H 1 list, initially empty. For a query W , if W already appears on the 
responds with D i .
• Challenge: Once F 0 decides that Phase 1 is over it outputs two keywords W 0 , W 1 on which it wishes to be challenged. F 1 responds as follows: 
This completes the description of F 1 .
Suppose that in a real attack game F 0 is given the public key (Q, Y = aQ − h 0 Q) and F 0 asks to be challenged on words W 0 and W 1 . In response, F 0 is given a challenge (bQ, ξ). Then, just as discussed in [1] , in the real attack game F 0 issues an H 2 query for either bQ) ) with probability at least 2ε(λ).
Now, assuming F 1 does not abort, we know that F 1 simulates a real attack game perfectly up to the moment when F 0 issues a query for either
a −1 b ) will appear in the H 2 -list with probability at least ε(λ). F 1 will choose the correct pair with probability at least 1/q 2 .
During the simulation, F 1 does not abort in phases 1 or 2 because of F 0 's Trapdoor queries is 1 − q T /n. The probability that F 1 does not abort during the challenge step is 2/n. Because n ≥ 2q T , we know that the probability that F 1 does not abort during the simulation is
Therefore, F 1 's success probability overall is at least ε(λ)/(nq 2 ).
IV. PKES SCHEMES WITHOUT SECURE CHANNEL
PKES schemes need secure (encrypted and authenticated) channels between users and servers. However, building a secure channel is usually expensive. In [3] , Baek et.al suggested a formal model for secure channel free public key encryption with keyword search (SCF-PEKS) scheme, which defines SCF-PEKS scheme with six algorithms.
In this section, we provide further discussion on the formal model for SCF-PEKS schemes, and present an new efficient SCF-PEKS scheme with provable security.
A. New Formal Model for SCF-PEKS Schemes
A SCF-PEKS scheme enables the sender to use the server's public key as well as the receiver's public key to generate PEKS ciphertexts. The receiver then can send a trapdoor to retrieve data associated with the encrypted keyword via a public channel.
Definition 3. A SCF-PEKS scheme consists of four polynomial-time algorithms:
• KeyGen: Take as input a security parameter λ, generate a public/private key pairs (pk, sk). This algorithm is used to generate key pairs for users (including the receiver and the server).
• Trapdoor: Take as input the receiver's private key sk r and a word W , produce a trapdoor T W .
• PKES: Take as input the receiver's public key pk r , the server's public key pk s and a word W , produce a searchable encryption of W . As to security, informally, we can say a SCF-PEKS scheme is secure if it can catch the following goals:
• The attacker without the trapdoors for given keywords cannot tell the PEKS ciphertext is produced from which keyword, even he knows the server's secret key. We call this security property "indistinguishability against chosen keyword attack with server's secret key" (IND-CKA-SSK).
• The attacker without the server's private key cannot make any decisions about the PEKS ciphertexts even though the attacker gets all the trapdoors for the keywords that it holds. We call this security property "indistinguishability against chosen keyword attack with all trapdoors" (IND-CKA-AT).
Formally, we define the following two security notions.
IND-CKA-SSK game:
• KeyGen:The challenger runs the KeyGen(λ) algorithm twice to generate the server's key pair (pk s , sk s ) and the receiver's key pair (pk r , sk r ). It gives pk s , pk r , sk s to the attacker.
• Phase 1, Challenge, Phase 2, Guess: The attacker A does these steps almost the same as that in IND-CKA 
The probability is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary.
Definition 4. A SCF-PKES scheme E is IND-CKA-SSK secure if for any polynomially time adversary A, Adv
is negligible.
IND-CKA-AT game:
• KeyGen: The challenger runs the KeyGen(λ) algorithm twice to generate the server's key pair (pk s , sk s ) and the receiver's key pair (pk r , sk r ). It gives pk s , pk r to the attacker.
• Challenge: At some point, the attacker A sends the challenger two words W 0 , W 1 on which it wishes to be challenged. The challenger picks a random b ∈ {0, 1} and gives the attacker C = P EKS(pk r , pk s , W b ) as the challenge PEKS.
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• Phase 2: The attacker can continue to ask for trapdoors T W for any keyword W of his choice.
The adversary A is called an IND-CKA-AT adversary. A's advantage is defined as:
B. A New SCF-PEKS Scheme from pairings
• Trapdoor: Take as input secret key x and keyword W , output
• PEKS: Take as input a receiver's public key X, a server's public key Y and a keyword W , select randomly
c).
• Test: Take as input the receiver's public key X, the server's private key y ∈ Z * q , a searchable encryption cipher-text (U, V, c) and trapdoor T W , test if H 2 (ê(yU, T W + V )) = c. If so, output "yes"; otherwise, output "no".
C. Consistency and Efficiency
Denote by M an ordinary scalar multiplication in (G 1 , +) , by E an Exp. operation in (G 2 , .), byê a computation of the pairing and by P a Maptopoint operation [4] . Do not take other operations into account. We compare our scheme to the scheme in [3] in the following Proof: F 1 is given input parameters of pairing (q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê) and an a random instance (P, aP, a 2 P, ..., a n P ) of the n-BDHI problem, where P is random in G * 1 and a is a random in Z * q . F 1 simulates the challenger and interacts with F 0 as follows: 2. Randomly choose an index t with 1 ≤ t ≤ n, sets v = 0. Select a random y ∈ Z * q and start by giving F 0 the reciver's public key X = aQ − h 0 Q and the server's key pair (y, yQ).
• Phase 1: H 1 -queries, H 2 -queries, Trapdoor queries. F 1 responds these queries the same way as that in the proof of Lemma 1.
• Phase 2: H 1 -queries, H 2 -queries, Trapdoor queries. F 1 responds to these queries in the same way it does in Phase 1 with the only restriction that W i = W 0 , W 1 for Trapdoor queries.
• Guess:Eventually F 0 produces its guess ι ∈ {0, 1} for ι. 
This completes the description of F 1 . Just as discussed in the proof of Lemma 1, F 1 's success probability overall is at least ε(λ)/(nq 2 ). • KeyGen: Select randomly x ∈ Z * q and start by giving F 0 the reciver's public key X = xP and the server's public key aP .
• Phase 1: H 1 -queries. F 1 maintains a H 1 list, 
• Challenge: Once F 0 decides that Phase 1 is over it outputs two keywords W 0 , W 1 on which it wishes to be challenged. F 1 runs the above algorithm for responding to H 1 -queries twice to obtain (W 0 , g 0 ) and (W 1 , g 1 ).
Selects ι ∈ {0, 1} and responds with the challenge ciphertext (g ι bP + xbP, cP, ξ) for random selected ξ ∈ {0, 1} log q . (Observe that if (g ι bP + xbP, cP, ξ) is a cipher-text corresponding to W ι , by definition, the test procedure of C is to test ξ = H 2 (ê(g ι bP + xbP, (g ι + x) −1 P + cP ) a ).)
• Phase 2: H 1 -queries, H 2 -queries, Trapdoor queries. F 1 responds to these queries in the same way it does in Phase 1.
• Guess:Eventually F 0 produces its guess ι ∈ {0, 1} for ι. This completes the description of F 1 .
We know that in the real attack game F 0 issues an H 2 query for H 2 (ê(g 0 bP + xbP, (g 0 + x)
H 2 (ê(g 1 bP + xbP, (g 1 + x) −1 P + cP ) a ) with probability at least 2ε(λ). F 1 simulates a real attack game perfectly up to the moment when F 0 issues a query for H 2 (ê(g ι bP +xbP, (g ι +x) −1 P +cP ) a ) with ι ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, the valueê(g ι bP + xbP, (g ι + x) −1 P + cP ) a will appear in the H 2 -list with probability at least 2ε(λ). F 1 will choose the correct pair with probability at least 1/q 2 . Therefore, F 1 's success probability overall is at least 2ε(λ)/q 2 .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, first, we propose a new PKES scheme based on pairings and prove its security in the random oracle model. The new scheme is more efficient than that of Boneh et.al's. Then, we provide further discussion on the notion of SCF-PEKS scheme, give a formal security model and present an efficient SCF-PEKS scheme. The new scheme can also be proved to be secure in the random oracle model.
